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    In this study, we intend to examine the Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) firms, from a financial perspective. The causal relationship between capital 
structure and cost of capital is investigated in a simultaneous equation framework. On the 
one hand, we relate international diversification to the firm’s capital structure, and on the 
other, we test their individual and collective inferences on the combined debt and equity 
cost of capital. Even though ICT companies are subject to the same market forces as 
other firms, the rapid development of the industry, complexity of their technologies and 
presence of the network effect may have valuable implications in determining their 
financing patterns. Using information pertaining to ICT and non-ICT firms listed on the 
NASDAQ stock exchange, we expect a negative correlation between international 
diversification and higher total and long-term debt ratios, and a reduction in the overall 
cost of capital. Results suggest significant heterogeneity among ICT and non-ICT firms 
and within each group by a number of firm characteristics. 
 
JEL classification: G32, C33, D21 
 






    Information  and  communication  technology  (ICT)
1  industries are expected to be 
subject to the same market forces as every other industry. However, the ICT industries 
are developed differently with respect to the capital market and growth. Thus, we believe, 
that some forces, such as the network effect, are particularly important in such industries. 
In this paper, we attempt to study the ICT sector from a financing point of view, by 
relating international diversification to the firm’s capital structure, and testing their 
individual and collective inferences on the combined debt and equity cost of capital. One 
recent study (Hyytinen & Pajarinen, 2005) attempted to study the financing of 
technology-intensive small businesses by analyzing their capital structure. They find that 
the leverage ratio of small ICT firms is more conservative than that of other small 
businesses. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper analyzing the relationship 
between the three aforementioned concepts, namely international diversification, capital 
structure and cost of capital, in the context of ICT firms.  
    Extensive  research  has  been  performed  in the area of international diversification, 
capital structure, and the cost of capital of non-ICT firms. Prior studies suggest that 
internationally diversified multinational corporations (hereafter, MNCs) carry less debt 
than domestic firms (Burgman, 1996; Chen, et al., 1997), and they seem to have a lower 
cost of debt (Reeb et al., 2001). Moreover, researchers tend to relate the cost of equity to 
international diversification, while others focus on the relationship between cost of debt 
and international diversification (Mansi and Reeb, 2002). Only recently have researchers 
attempted to analyze the weighted average cost of capital, instead of breaking it down 
into the cost of debt and the cost of equity (Singh and Nejadmalayeri, 2004). Previous 
studies suggest that greater international activity may lower the risks facing debt holders, 
due to diversification benefits, despite the fact that it increases the riskiness of equity 
capital due to risks specific to international operations (Reeb et al. 2001). Moreover, 
Bodnar and Wong (2000) show that international diversification may result in a reduction 
in the value of equity call option, leading to a decrease in the cost of debt and an increase 
in the cost of equity. The net effect on the overall cost of capital will depend on the 
degree of international diversification and level of debt financing. 
    In this study, we examine the causal relationship between capital structure and cost of 
capital of ICT firms in a simultaneous equation framework. We relate international 
diversification to the firm’s capital structure, and test their individual and collective 
inferences on the combined debt and equity cost of capital. Even though ICT companies 
are subject to the same market forces as their non-ICT counterparts, the rapid 
development of the industry, complexity of their technologies and presence of the 
network effect may have implications of determining their financing patterns. We expect 
a negative correlation between international diversification and higher total and long-term 
                                                 
1 In this study we adopt OECD’s 1998 definition of the ICT. Accordingly, we distinguish ICT 
manufacturing industry from ICT service industry. The product of an ICT manufacturing firm must be 
anticipated to fulfill the purpose of information processing and communication including transmission and 
display; or use electronic processing to spot, measure and/or record physical phenomena or to control a 
physical process. Components primarily intended for use in such products are also included. The products 
of a candidate service industry must be intended to enable the function of information processing and 
communication by electronic means; and the service provided must go beyond simply the supply of goods. 
 
  2 
debt ratios, and a reduction in the overall cost of capital. The data sample used in the 
empirical analysis represents ICT and non-ICT firms listed on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange, whilst having financial records on the DataStream database. NASDAQ began 
trading in 1971; it was the world's first electronic stock market. NASDAQ is now the 
largest U.S. electronic stock market. With approximately 3,200 companies, it lists more 
companies and, on average, trades more shares per day than any other stock exchange in 
the world. It is home to companies that are leaders across all areas of business including 
technology, retail, communications, services, transportation, media and biotechnology.  
    The main contribution of this paper lies in testing the theories of capital structure, cost 
of capital, and international diversification empirically within the ICT sector, and 
checking whether the uniqueness of the sector has some new implications concerning 
these theories. The ICT sector is compared with the non-ICT sector to investigate 
presence of heterogeneity among firms and to identify and quantify the impacts of 
determinants of the capital market. Further, In order to account for endogeneity and joint 
determination of the degree of financial leverage and the cost of capital, we use a system 
of equations jointly estimated. In addition the total debt is further broken down into short 
term and long term debt components. 
    Our results suggest significant heterogeneity among ICT and non-ICT firms and within 
each group by a number of firm characteristics. MNCs demonstrate a higher cost of 
capital (COC) and lower leverage ratios relative to domestic firms, due to increased 
systematic risk, as measured by the beta coefficient, and lower levels of tangible assets. 
Comparing ICT firms to non-ICT, we report that the former have higher COC and lower 
leverage ratios. Moreover, the results from the regression analysis reveal that 
international diversification negatively affects leverage and COC.  
        The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background, 
covering, the ICT sector, and the relation between international diversification, leverage 
and cost of capital. Section 3 and 4 describe the data and the methodology used. Section 5 
presents the results of the regression analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
    This section discusses the theoretical background on which this study is based. Issues, 
such as, the uniqueness of the ICT sector, international diversification, cost of capital and 
capital structure of firms, will be addressed. Different factors distinguishing the sector 
will be defined with their expected effects on the cost of capital and capital structure 
indicated in parenthesis.   
    
2.1 Uniqueness of the ICT sector 
 
    Previous  literature  confirms  the  hypothesis that ICT firms tend to rely on internal 
sources of funds in contrast to outside sources (Dahlstrand & Cetindamar, 2000; 
Hyytinen and Pajarinen, 2005; Roberts, 1990, 1991). Moreover, empirical results reveal 
that when using external financing, ICTs prefer equity rather than debt (Hyytinen and 
Pajarinen, 2005; Moore, 1994; Oakey, 1984; Roberts, 1990, 1991). For instance, Hewlett 
Packard and Microsoft tend to use their retained earnings rather than debt when financing 
new investments. According to Varian (2001), the information economy is characterized 
by certain traits that were uncommon in the industrial economy. We believe that these 
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characteristics have some bearing on the financial patterns pursued by ICT firms 
compared with their non-ICT counterparts. The key characteristics with their expected 
effect on leverage, shown in parenthesis, are listed below
2. 
    Network effects (-): The network effect causes a product to have a value dependent on 
the number of customers already owning or using that product. Metcalfe's law (Gilder, 
1993) states that the total value of a good or service that possesses a network effect is 
roughly proportional to the square of the number of customers already owning that good 
or using that service. The network effect concept was used as justification for some of the 
business models for dot-coms in the late 1990s. 
        According to Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2005), the positive feedback effects of a 
network good increase the under-investment costs of debt and diminish the benefits of 
debt in limiting the capacity for over-investment. It is difficult to predict the success of 
an ICT firm in the presence of strong network effects (Schoder, 2000), which usually 
increases the firm’s future cash flow volatility. Such a volatile characteristic of cash flow 
discourages lenders and decreases a firm’s ability to raise debt.  
        Technicality of the ICT business (-): It is arduous to asses and to understand the 
business of ICT firms by non-technical people, such as bank clerks, due to the high 
technicality imbedded in the business of ICTs (Deakins and Hussain, 1993). Moreover, 
the exact nature of an ICT investment is usually not well defined ex ante (Hyytinen and 
Pajarinen, 2005) which makes it harder for lenders to finance such projects, therefore, 
leading to a lower capacity in raising debt. 
    Intangibility (-): Lenders rely on collateral to secure their loans and to mitigate against 
adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), but ICT firms are known to hold low levels 
of tangible assets, i.e. fewer assets that could be used as collateral. The dependence on 
intangible assets by technology firms explains why they tend to finance their investment 
with equity rather than debt (Brealey and Myers, 2000).  
    Adverse selection (-): Adverse selection is present when the insiders of an ICT firm 
know more about the probability of the firm’s success than outside investors. For instance, 
it may be difficult to convey the quality of an investment to outsiders due to the 
confidential nature of the venture (Anton and Yao, 1994), leading to asymmetry in 
information, thus making it harder for ICT firms to raise debt. 
    Fixed entry costs vs. low marginal costs (-): The nature of some ICT products, exhibit 
fixed entry costs and low marginal costs (Varian, 2001). This fact, combined with an 
aggressive strategy of erecting entry barriers by ICT incumbents, would make the 
recovery of the fixed entry costs very difficult (Koski and Majumdar, 2002). In such a 
case, the use of debt becomes unachievable.    
 
2.2 International diversification and cost of capital 
 
    The existing literature offers mixed evidence on the cost of capital financing among 
MNCs. Several factors were identified as having an effect on the cost of capital. The 
expected effects of the determinants on the cost of capital of firms are indicated in 
parenthesis after each factor. 
                                                 
2 We expect a reverse effect on the cost of capital compared to the effect on leverage, i.e. if variable “X” 
has a positive effect on leverage, it would be expected to have a negative effect on the cost of capital. 
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    Earnings volatility (+): Hughes et al. (1975) argue that since MNCs receive their cash 
flows from imperfectly correlated markets, they enjoy lower earnings volatility relative to 
domestic firms. Similarly, Agmon and Lessard (1977) show that the MNC displays more 
stable earnings than domestic firms, which is recognized by investors as a sign of 
strength, resulting in a reduced cost of capital.  
    Risks  (+/-): On the one hand, MNCs face social and political risks, unique to the 
international market, which may be perceived by investors as a sign of weakness or 
insecurity (Aliber, 1984). These risks may increase the cost of capital. On the other hand, 
Lessard (1973) argues that international diversification may lead to a reduction in the 
general risks facing a firm, due to the diversification effect, which will lower the cost of 
capital.  
    Internal  capital  markets  (-):  Since MNCs operate across countries; they have the 
ability to create their own internal capital markets, which will provide them with a 
cheaper source of finance, and lower cost of capital, compared to external markets 
(Caves, 1971; Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003). Consequently, a non-positive relation is 
predicted between the firm’s foreign operations and leverage when internal capital 
markets bypass the informational asymmetries of external capital markets (Stein, 1997). 
    Information asymmetries (+): Based on the Pecking Order Hypothesis, costs related to 
information asymmetries between the firm’s management and its stockholders have a 
substantial effect on the firm’s choice of funding. Information asymmetries create two 
problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection arises when banks are 
unable to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful projects because they are 
incapable of assessing the firm’s future prospects (Binks et al., 1992). Furthermore, due 
to moral hazard, equity holders have an incentive to pursue risky projects, because they 
stand to gain more than the debt holders if the firm turns successful. This may increase 
the possibility of bankruptcy. 
    MNCs may face higher degrees of information asymmetries due to institutional, legal, 
socio-cultural and political differences across nations (Burgman, 1996). Further, Lee and 
Kwok (1988) and Doukas and Pantzalis (2003) find that it becomes more difficult to 
monitor firms once they become internationally active relative to domestic firms. 
Consequently, bondholders will require higher interest payments on loans to firms that 
are more susceptible to information asymmetries and which require greater monitoring 
costs.  
 
2.3 International diversification and capital structure. 
 
    The following factors are identified as having an effect on the capital structure of a 
firm. Some factors are known to increase debt usage while others are known to decrease 
it. The sign between parentheses indicates the variables expected effect on debt usage. 
    Growth  opportunities  (-):  Myers’ (1977) confers that growth opportunities can be 
viewed as call options; he also shows that issuing risky debt reduces the present value of 
a firm holding these options. Thus, firms with greater growth opportunities should be 
more vulnerable to agency costs of debt. Following that, Kim and Lyn (1986) suggested 
that MNCs often outperform local companies in host countries and have more growth 
opportunities; Stulz (1990) and Smith and Watts (1992), show that Firms with profitable 
growth opportunities may, therefore, use less debt financing. Likewise, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) extend this analysis to show that the relation between market leverage 
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and the market-to-book ratio, a commonly used proxy for growth options, is negative and 
significant across seven different countries. 
    Level of intangibility (-): Ethier (1996) and Ethier and Horn (1990) demonstrate that 
MNCs carry more intangible assets than domestic firms. Knowing that intangible assets 
could not be used as collateral, it would be sound to assume that debt holders will require 
higher return on debt, hence discouraging firms from borrowing.  
    Agency costs (-): Previous literature offers sufficient evidence on the increasing agency 
costs of debt for MNCs (Myers, 1977; Chkir and Cosset, 2001; Mansi and Reeb, 2002). 
Burgman (1996) suggests that the debt ratio for MNCs is determined by a tradeoff 
between the tax advantage of debt and the agency costs of debt. Burgman reports lower 
debt ratios for MNCs relative to domestic firms. Similarly, Lee and Kwok (1988) and 
Fatemi (1988) find that MNCs display lower levels of debt financing compared to 
domestic firms, due to the agency costs of debt. 
    Foreign exchange rate exposure (+/-): On the one hand, Black (1990) notes that all 
firms face some level of foreign exchange exposure; however, as firms go international 
their foreign exchange exposure is exacerbated. Building on that, it would be expected 
for MNCs to carry more debt in order to hedge against those risks. Chen et al. (1997) 
conclude that the use of foreign currency-denominated debt to hedge against exchange 
risks, should lead to a positive relationship between debt ratio and international activities. 
More recently, Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) argue that due to firms’ arbitraging 
differences in corporate tax rates across countries, they issue debt in the currencies of 
countries in which they operate to hedge the underlying exposure. On the other hand, the 
foreign exchange risks lead to increased variability in a firm’s domestic currency 
denominated earnings (Reeb et al., 1998). Increased variability may lead to lower debt 
ratios. 
    Coinsurance effect (+): Lewellen (1971) argues that a coinsurance effect would be 
formed when combining businesses with imperfectly correlated cash flow streams. This 
effect creates more capacity for debt. Li and Li (1996) show that a firm may face over 
investment if it is subjected to a combination of diversification and low leverage. 
Accordingly, diversified firms may have greater debt capacity than non-diversified firms. 
There is also evidence that diversification across political boundaries reduces risk more 
than diversification across industries within one country (Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994). 
Although Comment and Jarrell (1995) question the robustness of their findings, their 
empirical results show that leverage ratios average 33–34% in their sample, but increase 
to 38–40% for the firms with the largest number of business segments. Similarly, Chkir 
and Cosset (2001) indicate that leverage increases with both international and product 
diversification, and a combination of both leads to a lower threat of bankruptcy. 
 
3. The Data 
 
3.1 Selection of the Sample 
 
    The data set used in this study included 2,782 firms listed on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange, observed for a period of 10 years from 1995 until 2004. Information on sample 
firms was extracted from the DataStream (DS) database. The DS database provides 
operating summaries, annual balance sheets and income statements, sources and uses of 
funds, growth rates, financial ratios, international business, summary stock data, and 
  6 
accounting practices on a large set of worldwide firms from different countries of origin. 
This includes information covering more than 6000 firms from the United States.  
        From the NASDAQ sample we excluded all regulated utilities, with a Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code equal to 4900-4999 (Singh et al., 2003), and all 
financial firms (SIC code equal to 6000-6999), because they are known to have a 
different financial structure relative to other firms. Moreover, we eliminated those with 
missing observations essential for the calculation of the dependent variable of cost of 
capital (COC). For firms with a missing beta, which is one of the main variables in 
calculating the cost of equity, we used the Value Line (VL) database to fill in the gaps. 
VL publishes more than a dozen products providing timely information on stocks, mutual 
funds, special situations, options and convertibles. The final data set used in the empirical 
part of this study is an unbalanced panel data. It contained 1,763 firms observed 
consecutively 4-10 years with a total of 17,626 firm-year observations.  
    The distinction between domestic and MNCs can be based on different measures, for 
instance Lee and Kwok (1988) and Burgman (1996) used the foreign tax ratio as a proxy 
for international diversification. In this paper we chose to follow the requirements of the 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 14 (FASB 1976), where MNCs are 
identified as those reporting ratios of foreign assets, foreign sales or foreign income of at 
least 10%. Firms are classified as domestic if their foreign ratios are less than 10%. 
    The second key classification is the distinction between ICT and non-ICT firms, which 
is based on the industrial classification codes reported by the OECD (2000). A number of 
dummy variables are included in the model specification to account for industry 
heterogeneity.  
    Table  1  provides  a  breakdown  of  the  sample into various categories according to 
specialization, diversification and industry classification. The share of ICT firms is 
38.02%, while the share of international firms is 37.85%. Firms identified as 
Manufacturing (47.74%), and Services (30.24%) constitute the major industries. 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (0.49%), Construction (0.59%) and Mining (2.07%) are 
among underrepresented industries.  
 
3.2 Definition of Variables 
 
A. Dependent Variables 
 
    Our two dependent variables are leverage (LV), proxied by the debt ratio, and cost of 
capital (COC). The most common measure of leverage; is the percentage of total debt to 
total assets (TD/TA). In order to test the different effects of short-term and long-term 
debt, we included two additional measures (STD/TA); the ratio of short-term debt to total 
assets, and (LTD/TA), the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. 
    In calculating the COC, we used the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), which 
was found to be the dominant discount rate used in the discounted cash flow (DCF) 
analysis (Bruner et al., 1998). WACC is calculated based on the following equation:  
 
(1)   ) ( ) ( ) ) 1 ( ( preferred preferred equity equity debt debt K W K W K t W WACC + + − =  
 
where  K is the component cost of capital, W is the weight of each component as a 
percentage of total capital and t is the marginal corporate tax rate.  
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        The challenging part of the WACC equation (1) is calculating the cost of equity 
( ). Following Bruner et al. (1998) we used the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), 
which is found to be the dominant model for estimating the cost of equity. The CAPM 
depicts that the required return (K) on any asset can be expressed as: 
equity K
 
(2)   ) ( f m f R R R K − + = β  
 
where   is risk free rate,  is market risk premium and  f R f m R R − β  is the Beta coefficient.  
    Bruner et al. (1998) reports that the two mostly used risk-free rates are the 90-day 
Treasury bill yield and the long-term Treasury bond yield. Long-term bond yields reveal 
the default free holding period returns existing on long-term investments and thus directly 
represent the types of investments made by companies. For this study we use the yield on 
ten-year Treasuries, as reported by the US treasury department, since the yield curve is 
usually flat beyond ten years. 
    The financial literature states that the equity market risk premium should be equal to 
the excess return expected by investors on the market portfolio relative to riskless assets. 
We use a 7.0% fixed rate following Bruner et al. (1998). Their survey results showed that 
37% (highest share) of the corporations surveyed, use the fixed rate approach, and 50% 
(also highest share) of the financial advisers use the same approach, with a rate of 7.0 to 
7.4%. 
    The equity beta  ) (β  of a stock is its systematic or market risk. A stock’s risk can be 
divided into two parts: systematic and unsystematic. Only systematic risk is priced by the 
market as investors expect to be compensated for, in terms of additional return. This is 
because it is easy for investors to diversify their portfolios such that unsystematic risk is 
washed out. For cost of capital purposes, an estimate of future equity beta is required. 
The starting point for its estimation, however, necessarily requires the use of historical 
returns data. The most common approach is to estimate a time series regression of the 
stock’s return relative to the market portfolio. For this paper, we chose to use the Beta 
published in DS and VL databases. Over half of the corporations and 40% of financial 
advisers, in Bruner et al.’s (1998) sample rely on published sources for their beta 
estimates. 
    The cost of debt component ( ) for the WACC calculation is easier to estimate 
than the cost of equity. While the cost of equity is not observable and must be estimated 
by some economic model, the cost of debt for most companies is readily available. If the 
company in question has publicly traded debt outstanding, the common method for 
estimating the nominal cost of debt is to take the current market yield on that debt. For 
our study we used the cost of debt as reported in the DS database. 
debt K
    The cost of preferred stock ( ) is the minimum required rate of return that 
investors require on newly issued preference shares. Due to the unavailability of the data, 
this component was dropped from our WACC calculation.      
preferred K
 
B. Explanatory Variables 
 
    The following, are a set of explanatory variables recognized in the literature as having 
possible impacts on capital structure and cost of capital, some of them are included to 
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capture the international diversification effect, while others are unique to the ICT sector. 
These variables serve as proxy for the set of factors described in the theoretical 
background section. They will be used in this study to relate cost of capital and leverage 
to the degree of international diversification, and to test the difference in financing ICT 
firms relative to non-ICT. The key variables with their expected effect on leverage shown 
in parenthesis are listed below. We expect a reverse effect on the cost of capital compared 
to the effect on leverage. 
    LSAL (+/-): A proxy for firm size, the log of sales. Several studies suggested that 
leverage is affected by the size of the firm (e.g., Ang et al., 1982; Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Lee and Kwok, 1988; Burgman, 1996). On the one hand, 
size should be inversely related with leverage assuming large firms have greater capacity 
in their capital markets relative to small firms. On the other hand, large firms reduce 
bankruptcy risk, thus having a positive effect on leverage (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003). 
        ROE5 and SAL5 (-): Following Singh et al. (2003) and Singh and Nejadmalayeri 
(2004) we measure growth by the 5-year average of the return on equity, and the 5-year 
average sales growth. 
        FS/TS (+/-): A measure of the degree of international diversification is included, 
proxied by the percentage of foreign sales to total sales (Singh and Nejadmalayeri., 2004). 
Previous literature presents contradicting results concerning the effect of international 
diversification on firm’s leverage. For instance, Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004), show 
that internationally diversified firms support higher level of debt financing that directly 
results in a reduction in the overall cost of capital, while other researchers (Lee & Kwok, 
1988; Burgman, 1996; Singh et al., 2003; Fatemi, 1988) provide evidence that MNCs 
support a lower level of debt financing relative to DCs.  
    BETA (-): A measure of the firm’s systematic risk used by Singh and Nejadmalayeri 
(2004), and a main component of the weighted average cost of capital. A high beta 
should lead to low leverage while increasing the overall cost of capital 
    ATO (+): Asset turnover ratio is a proxy for managerial agency costs, measured by the 
ratio of sales to total assets. According to Singh and Davidson (2003), a high ATO 
reflects efficient asset management practices, while a low ratio signals possible asset 
usage for unproductive purposes. Therefore, firms with considerable agency conflict will 
have lower asset turnover ratios relative to those having less agency conflict. 
    NPE/TA (+): Asset tangibility, the ratio of net plant and equipment to total assets, 
previously used by Johnson (2003) and Singh and Nejadmalayeri (2004). As already 
mentioned, a higher level of tangible assets implies more assets that can be used as 
collateral, thus a higher capacity to raise debt. 
    Finally,  we  include  an  ICT-dummy  variable, where (ICT) is set equal to 1 if it’s 
standard industrial classification (SIC) code matches OECD’s (2000) classification, and a 





    Different approaches and different models have been used to study the capital structure 
of ICT firms. For instance, Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2005) studied the leverage usage of 
ICT firms without looking at the effect on the cost of capital, by using a regression 
equation with only leverage as the dependent variable. Other researchers considered the 
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cost of equity excluding the cost of debt from their equations, while some studied the cost 
of debt without taking into consideration the cost of equity. 
        In this study we tend to identify corporate capital structure and cost of capital 
differentials across ICT, non-ICT, international, and domestic firms. In order to account 
for the interdependence between the two endogenous variables, COC and LV, we use a 
simultaneous equations model estimated by three stage (3SLS) least squares estimation 
methods. In order to relate leverage and cost of capital to the degree of international 
diversification we run the following regressions: 
(3)     ) , , , ( t i it it it X X X LV F COC =
where COC is a function of a set of variables including but not limited to the Leverage 
ratio,  . The vector , represent the determinants of cost of capital, that are firm and 
time variant,  , is a vector of observable firm-specific variables that are constant over 
time, while  , is a vector of time variant determinants that are constant across firms. In 
addition, dummy variables are included to capture the unobservable firm-specific and 
time-specific heterogeneity effects. The leverage model is written as: 
it LV it X
i X
t X
 (4)     () t i it it it Z Z Z COC G LV , , , =
where Leverage is determined by another set of variables, therefore we set   as a vector 
of the determinants of the leverage variables that are changing both over time and across 
firms, and include Z  and  , which are vectors of observable variables in one dimension 
but constant in another. Moreover, dummy variables are included to capture the 
unobservable firm-specific, time-specific and other adjustment heterogeneity effects. 
it Z
i t Z
    Finally, by rearranging equation 3 and 4 and appending an error term ( ) it ε to them, we 
use the following equation for COC: 
(5a)   it
js m
mt m si s jit j it LV it X X X LV COC ε α α α α α + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ 0  
where Leverage is specified in terms of variables according to the following equation: 
(5b)   it
js m
mt m si s jit j it COC it Z Z Z COC LV ν β β β β β + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ 0   
As previously mentioned we had to account for endogeneity and joint determination of 
the degree of financial leverage and the cost of capital, thus, we used a system of 
equations specified as follows: 
(6)        
     
 

∑∑ ∑ + + + + + =
∑∑ ∑ + + + + + =
js m
it mt m si s jit j it COC it
js m
it mt m si s jit j it LV it
v Z Z Z COC LV
X X X LV COC
β β β β β
ε α α α α α
0
0
The system in (6) accounts for joint determination of the two decision variables and their 
feedback effects. By doing so, one avoids simultaneity and endogeneity biases resulting 
from estimation of the two decisions (5a and 5b) separately. The two sources of bias have 
previously been neglected in the literature. The presence of a two way causal relationship 
between the two decision variables (3SLS) or a recursive one way (2SLS) is statistically 
testable. 
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5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
    Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used based on the NASDAQ 
listed sample of 17,626 firm-year observations. The sample is divided into sub-samples 
of Multinational, Domestic, ICT and non-ICT corporations.   
    Panel A of Table 2 presents a comparison between international and domestic firms by 
mean and standard deviation, we also demonstrate the results of the pooled t-test, which 
measures the significance of the difference between the variables of the two groups. It 
shows that an average MNC holds more assets, has a larger equity base, generates more 
sales and creates more income, than a domestic firm, with all four variables having a 
significant t-test at the 1% level. It seems that the MNC enjoys a higher growth level as 
evident from the 5-year income growth variable significant at the 1% level. The 5-year 
sales growth mean variable is higher for domestic firms (22.59) relative to MNCs (21.34), 
but the difference is not supported by the t-test results. Profitability, as measured by the 
pre-tax margin, return on assets, 5-year average return on assets, return on equity, and 5-
year average return on equity, is also higher for the MNC relative to the domestic firm 
and significant at the 1% level except for the ROA and ROE ratios which were found to 
have insignificant mean difference. Moreover, the MNC has a mean beta of 2.08 
compared to 1.67 for the domestic firm; therefore, with riskier equity as disclosed by beta, 
and lower level of tangible assets, as disclosed by the net plant & equipment to total 
assets ratio (NPE/TA), we should expect a higher cost of capital and lower levels of debt. 
The results are consistent with our expectations; the MNC’s COC is higher than the 
domestic’s by 2.23 percentage points and the leverage ratios, whether measured by total, 
long-term or short-term debt, are lower. MNCs exhibit better market performance, as 
measured by the price to book ratio, and the 5-year average price to book ratio. Thus, the 
results suggest presence of a systematic difference between the MNC and Domestic 
enterprises and their behavior in the financial market. Moreover, 18 of the 22 variables 
exhibit highly significant mean differences at the 1% level, while only 4 appear to be 
statistically insignificants, based on the t-test. 
    Panel B of Table 2 compares ICT firms to non-ICT by mean and standard deviation of 
the variables, while showing the mean equality t-test results. ICT firms own more total 
assets, have a higher equity base, generate more sales and creates more income relative to 
non-ICT firms. All mean variables appear to be statistically different at the 1% level of 
significance, except for the sales variable. A low level of tangible assets (16.04 vs. 26.24), 
as captured by the net plant, property and equipment to total assets variable, combined 
with a higher beta (2.28 vs. 1.54), would suggest a higher COC and lower debt to assets 
ratios for ICT firms. Once again, the results are found to be consistent with our 
expectations. The COC recorded a mean of 17.80 for the ICT sector and a mean of just 
13.94 for other sectors combined. The ICT’s total debt to assets ratio equals 14.39% 
compared to 20.01% for non-ICT, similarly the ICT sector demonstrated a lower long-
term and short-term debt to assets ratios relative to non-ICT. Moreover, The price to book 
ratio and the 5-year average price to book ratio show better market performance for the 
ICT firm relative to other firms. The difference is significant at the 1% level. Looking at 
profitability ratios, as evaluated by the return on equity, return on assets, 5-year average 
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return on equity, and 5-year average return on assets, show that non-ICT firms are more 
profitable and the difference is significant at the 1% level except for the return on assets 
ratio. The pretax margin shows ambiguous results. As expected, ICT firms exhibit higher 
growth than non-ICT firms which is displayed by the 5-year sales growth and the 5-year 
net income growth. The results also show that ICT firms tend to operate in the 
international level more than non-ICT firms, which is evident by the high FS/TS mean of 
23.87 for ICT firms and 11.91 for non-ICT firms, with a mean difference of 11.96, 
significant at the 1% level.  
    Table 3 represents the correlation matrix of some of the main variables used in our 
regression analysis. The sign of the correlation coefficient between two variables shows 
the direction of correlation. The COC and beta variables are negatively correlated with 
leverage, an anticipated result, since firms with high systematic risk, as proxied by beta, 
and high COC, will find it difficult to raise debt. The ICT variable shows significant 
correlation with leverage (-), COC (+), beta (+), and international diversification (+). 
Foreign diversification seems to be negatively correlated to leverage, while positively 
correlated to beta and COC. The asset turnover ratio is correlated positively to leverage 
and negatively to COC. The BETA-COC and LSAL-ATO pair-wise coefficients are a bit 
high, which may signal collinearity problem between these variables and a difficulty in 
separating their effects on cost of capital and leverage.   
 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
 
    Our regression analysis includes two sections with two sub-sections each. First, we test 
the relationship between leverage ratios and international diversification (Table 4, Panel 
A), followed by an assessment of the relationship between cost of capital and 
international diversification, for all sectors (Table 4, Panel B). The relations above are 
tested further based on aggregate, ICT and non-ICT sub-samples. Second, we divide our 
sample into ICT and non-ICT firms and repeat the previous tests based on total leverage 
(Table 5, Panel A and B). To account for endogeneity and possible simultaneity, the two 
equations are estimated using 3SLS estimation methods. It should be noted that the 
figures in Table 4 and Table 5 are extracted from both the 2SLS and 3SLS regression 
results. The 3SLS results are used when a two way causal relationship is detected 
between leverage and COC, while the 2SLS results are used when the causal relationship 
is just one way, i.e. when leverage affects COC and not the other way around. The nature 
of the causal relationship between the two variables and estimation method is determined 
by the significance of the causal factors.  
    Examining the mean square error (MSE) and the coefficient of determination (R
2), we 
find that the five models are a good fit. The STD/TA (Model 2), and the LTD/TA (Model 
3) models, from the 3SLS results, display a combined MSE of 0.9989, and 1.0087, while 
exhibiting a combined R
2 of 0.5629, and 0.5802, respectively. The TD/TA model (Model 
1), in which the coefficient of COC in the leverage model is insignificant favors a 2SLS 
method. It exhibits a MSE of 18.7151 and an R
2 of 0.1766 for the leverage equation, 
while showing a MSE of 4.6520 and an R
2 of 0.7157 for the cost of capital equation. 
Comparing ICT (Model 5) to non-ICT firms (Model 4), we obtain similar results. Both 
models are found to be a good fit. The ICT model recorded a MSE of 17.3604 and an R
2 
of 0.2613, for the leverage equation, and a MSE of 5.1460 and an R
2 of 0.6912 for the 
COC equation, suggesting a 2SLS method as the preferred estimation method, while the 
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non-ICT model registered a combined MSE of 1.0221 and a combined R
2 of 0.5674, for 
both equations, favoring 3SLS estimation method.  
    In sum, the models in which leverage is defined by the long term debt ratio (Model 3), 
and short term debt ratio (Model 2) we observe a two way causal relationship between 
leverage and cost of capital, while in the remaining model, where leverage is defined as 
total debt ratio (Model 1) the results suggest a one way causal relationship. In the former, 
the leverage causes cost of capital, while in the latter cost of capital causes leverage. 
Chow test (F-test value = 49.22) of aggregate total debt versus a disaggregation of debt 
into short and long run rejects the null hypothesis of same effects.  
 
A. International Diversification and Leverage. 
 
    Table 4, Panel A shows that international diversification (FS/TS) negatively affects 
leverage, as measured by total and long-term debt to assets ratios, at a 1% level of 
significance. This may be due to the legal, social, political and foreign exchange risks 
facing MNCs. Similar results were reached by Shapiro (1978), Lee and Kwok (1988), 
Burgman (1996) and Chen et al. (1997). Per contra, short-term debt appears to have a 
positive correlation with international diversification at a 1% level of significance. Fatemi 
(1988) explains this result by the fact that MNCs have greater access to international 
money markets and a relative lack of depth in the long-term markets elsewhere. 
    The cost of capital variable has no significant effect on total debt but negatively affects 
short-term and long-term debt at a 1% and 10% level of significance, respectively. As the 
COC increases the firm will find it difficult and expensive to borrow money, thus will be 
forced to rely on its retained earnings. 
        The size of the firm, as measured by the log of sales, affects positively the three 
measures of leverage, so does the firm’s tangibility variable, which is measured by the 
net plant property and equipment to total assets ratio. Both outcomes could be interpreted 
by the fact that large firms with substantial collateralized assets attract more debt than 
smaller firms with a larger base of intangible assets. 
    Fast growing firms with highly profitable projects are more likely to depend on equity 
rather than debt (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Consistent with the theory the two growth 
proxies, 5-years sales growth and 5-years return on equity, show a negative relation with 
leverage, noting that (ROE5) is significant at a 1% level for the three measures of 
leverage, while (SAL5) was found to have insignificant effect on short- term debt. 
    Examining the industry dummies, we find that industries like mining, manufacturing, 
and retail trade have a highly significant lower total and long-term debt ratios relative to 
the reference industry (agriculture, forestry and fishing), while showing no significant 
difference for the short-term debt ratio.  
 
B. International Diversification and Cost of Capital 
 
    The international diversification variable appears to have a negative relation with COC, 
which is consistent with the results reached by Reeb et al. (2001), and Kim and Stulz 
(1988) (Table 4, Panel B).  
        Significant at 1% level, the COC appears to decrease as total and long-term debt 
increase. Here we should expect the COC to increase, whenever one of the right hand 
side variables of the WACC equation (1), increases, so if the leverage ratio increases the 
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COC is also expected to increase; but if we are to compare the change in the COC 
variable due to a change in leverage relative to a change in equity we should expect a 
lower change in the COC, since the cost of debt is always lower than the cost of equity.  
The short-term debt to total assets ratio seems to have no significant effect on the cost of 
capital. As expected the beta variable is positively related to the COC, at 1% level of 
significance. Firms with a high systematic risk require a higher returns on equity, as a 
result, the increase in the cost of equity component of the equation, raises the overall 
COC. 
    The literature provides ample evidence on the relation between agency costs and debt 
financing. Lee and Kwok (1988), and Chen et al. (1997) demonstrate that higher agency 
costs lead to lower debt ratios. Accordingly, we would expect a positive relation between 
agency costs and COC. High agency costs between managers and shareholders, would 
increase the cost of equity, whereas between managers and debt holders, would increase 
the cost of debt, consequently, increasing the overall COC. Our agency cost measure 
(ATO) was found to be negatively related to the COC because a high asset turnover ratio 
reveals managerial efficiency in utilizing corporate assets, reflecting lower managerial 
agency problem leading to low levels of COC. 
    A large firm signals strength and future growth, subsequently lenders would be willing 
to ask for a lower cost of debt. Lowering a firm’s cost of debt, would eventually reduce 
the overall COC. Our proxy for size (LSAL) has a significant negative impact on the 
COC. Most of the industrial sector dummy coefficients were found to be statistically 
insignificant suggesting no systematic industry heterogeneity in the cost of capital.      
 
C. ICT firms vs. non-ICT firms 
 
    We first conducted a Chow test, in order to check for equality between the pooled 
model (Model 1 in Table 4) and the ICT (Model 4) and non-ICT models (Model 5) 
separated (Table 5). The results, not reported here for brevity, for both equations (COC 
and Leverage) were rejected with an F-value of 23.1 for the leverage equation and an F-
value of 70.85 for the COC equation. We conclude, that it is rational to separate the two 
models and to look at the difference between the variables’ effect. 
    The results reported in Panel A of Table 5 show, that as the cost of capital increases for 
non-ICT firms, leverage is expected to decrease, i.e. showing a negative relation between 
COC and leverage significant at the 10% level. Under the ICT model the COC seems to 
have no effect on leverage suggesting a one way causal relationship from debt to cost of 
capital. The capacity to raise debt increases with firm size, for both sectors, but with 
different levels of significance, 1% for non-ICT and 5% for ICT. As already mentioned, 
ICT firms rely more on internal financing and prefer to issue stocks rather than bonds, 
this applies to small, medium and large firms. Moreover, the growth in return on equity 
and the growth in sales variables, appear to have the same negative effect on leverage for 
both ICT and non-ICT sectors, significant at the 1% level. This could be explained by the 
fact that shareholders would prefer to use internal financing if they expect high returns on 
equity and a growth in sales. As expected the tangibility variable, measured by NPE/TA, 
positively affects leverage in all sectors at a 1% level of significance. 
    One major difference between ICT and non-ICT firms is noticed in the coefficient of 
the international diversification variable. The FS/TS variable negatively affects leverage 
at 1% significance level for non-ICT firms, while having insignificant impact on leverage 
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within the ICT sector. Leverage seems to be lower for ICT and non-ICT firms in the 
manufacturing, wholesale trade, and services sector compared with other sectors. 
        Looking at Table 5 Panel B, the COC appears to increase as leverage decreases, 
significant at 1% and 5% levels for non-ICT and ICT firms, respectively. As anticipated, 
the international diversification variable is negatively related to the cost of capital for all 
sectors at the 10% level of significance. The firm’s systematic risk, as measured by beta, 
has a positive effect on COC, at 1% level of significance. It makes no difference whether 
the firm is an ICT firm or not, a higher beta leads to higher COC. Size seems to have a 
negative effect on the COC for non-ICT firms significant at the 1% level, while records 
insignificant effect in the ICT sector. Moreover, the Asset Turnover Ratio (ATO) was 
found to be negatively related to the COC significant at the 5% level for ICT firms, while 
showing no significant effect under the non-ICT sector.    
    In order to compare international ICT firms to domestic ICT firms we added one more 
heterogeneity test. The results, not reported for brevity, indicate that international ICT 
firms are stronger relative to their national counterparts, in terms of growth, profitability, 
and market performance. However, international ICT firms possess higher systematic 




        This study examines the relationship between International diversification, capital 
structure, and cost of capital, while comparing ICT to non-ICT firms and short term to 
long-term debt. Specifically, we analyze the effects of International diversification on the 
leverage and cost of capital of 1,763 ICT and non-ICT firms listed on the NASDAQ 
stock exchange over the 1995-2004 period. The aim of this paper is to provide deeper 
insight regarding ICT firm’s leverage behavior, which is the major industrial sector in the 
so called new economy. 
    The results show that international diversification negatively affects leverage and the 
cost of capital. This may be due to the legal, social, political and foreign exchange risks 
facing a MNC. Moreover, we report an inverse relation between the cost of capital and 
leverage. By increasing leverage the firm’s cost of capital decreases, owing to the fact 
that the cost of debt is usually lower than the cost of equity; accordingly, higher levels of 
debt would abate the weighted average cost of capital. Another explanation might be the 
unit cost of debt is declining in the level of debt.  
    Comparing ICT firms to non-ICT firms, our results are found to be consistent with 
previous literature. ICT firms rely more on equity financing as evident by lower debt to 
assets ratios and a higher equity base. Moreover, several studies have shown that equity is 
the preferred funding choice for technology based firms, some argue that this is due to the 
pursuit of innovation (Roberts, 1991), others provide evidence showing that the pursuit of 
wealth is another important factor (Amit et al., 2001).  
    Our findings have some policy implications. The fact that ICT firms have higher, beta, 
intangible assets and COC coefficients, combined with a preference towards equity 
financing, debt financing would be a last resort solution. The US is known to have a well-
developed venture capital and informal equity markets. We believe that policy makers 
should keep on promoting such markets; this would ensure financing ICT firms, 
especially small and start-up firms. Moreover, in many countries governments support 
ICT firms by providing debt-related subsidies, which based on the results of this paper 
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may hinder investment in ICT instead of boosting it. We believe that public policy 
makers should enhance the availability of equity capital instead of providing subsidized 
debt finance for investment.  
    Based on the comparison between international ICT firms and domestic ICT firms, we 
believe, that ICT firms will perform better if they were to operate on the international 
level, because the ICT firm’s performance is dependent on its ability to create standards. 
Having access to the international market will definitely increase a firm’s chances in 
creating and maintaining a standard. For instance, Microsoft’s success is directly related 
to its ability in turning Windows into an international standard. 
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Table 1: Frequency Distribution of firms. 
     Cumulative  Cumulative 
Variable  Frequency  Percent   Frequency   Percent  
A. Specialization: 
Non-ICT firms        10925         61.98           10925          62.98 
ICT firms         6701         38.02           17626         100.00 
 
B. Diversification: 
Domestic firms         10954         62.15           10954          62.15 
International firms         6672         37.85           17626         100.00 
 
C. Industry Classification: 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing            86          0.49              86  0.49 
Mining           364          2.07             450           2.55 
Construction           104          0.59             554           3.14 
Manufacturing          8415         47.74            8969          50.89 
Transportation Communication         1249          7.09           10218          57.97 
Wholesale Trade          786          4.46           11004          62.43 
Retail Trade          1292          7.33           12296          69.76 
Services          5330         30.24           17626          100.00 
Note: The Industry Classification is based on the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code, were ICT 
firms are defined as those with an SIC code equal to 3357, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3651, 3661, 3663, 3671, 3672, 
3699, 3823, 3825, 3826, 4812, 4813, 4822, 4832, 4833, 4841, 4899, 5045, or is between 3577-3579 or 3674-3679 or 
7371-7379. All other SIC codes belong to the non-ICT sector. Domestic firms are defined as those with a foreign sales 
to total sales ratio (FS/TS) of less than 10%, while International firms are those with a (FS/TS) of greater than or equal 
to 10%. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing firms are those with an SIC code less than 999, Mining firms (1000-1499), 
Construction firms (1500-1999), Manufacturing firms (2000-3999), Transportation Communication (4000-4900), 
Wholesale Trade (5000-5199), Retail Trade (5200-5999), Services (7000-8999). 
 
 
  20Table 2: Summary statistics by diversification and specialization (1995-2004). 
Panel A: Diversification 
 MNC Domestic    
Variable Description  Mean  Std  Dev Mean  Std  Dev  Pooled  t-Test 
A. Dependent variables: 
COC  Cost of Capital  16.79  8.99  14.56  8.67  -16.35a 
TD/TA  Total Debt to Total Assets  14.93 19.13  19.68 21.64  14.38a 
STD/TA  Short-term Debt to Total Assets  4.07  8.78  4.90  10.09  5.56a 
LTD/TA  Long-term Debt to Total Assets  10.86  17.37  14.78  19.85  13.33a 
B. Independent variables: 
BETA  Beta  2.08 1.29  1.67 1.22  -21.79a 
SAL5 Sales  Growth  5-years  21.34 38.38  22.59 43.80  1.93x 
NI5  Net Income 5-years  11.87  30.17  5.84  16.13  -17.28a 
PTAX  Pretax  Margin  7.41 14.44  1.85 12.07  -27.52a 
ROA5  Return on Assets 5-years Average  4.65  8.82  4.18  8.52  -3.49a 
ROA  Return on Assets    6.06  12.30  5.77  12.14  -1.57x 
ROE5  Return on Equity 5-years Average  7.42  17.66  6.19  16.07  -4.73a 
ROE  Return  on  Equity  9.39 22.43  9.06 22.92  -0.94x 
FS/TS  Foreign Sales to Total Sales  42.26  24.87  0.75  2.13  -173.9a 
P/B  Price to Book  3.42  2.86  3.17  2.83  -5.48a 
P/B5  Price to Book 5-years Average  3.43  2.70  3.00  2.65  -10.36a 
NPE/TA  Net Plant & Equipment to Total Assets  17.40  15.35  25.39  23.03  25.17a 
ATO  Asset Turnover Ratio  45.41  11.09  41.33  15.88  -18.46a 
TA  Total  Assets  1003357.14 4305077.86  394113.54 3086278.57  -10.92a 
CE Common  Equity  554668.33  2674001.31  173396.35  116293.12 -13.05a 
SAL  Sales  896895.85 4790179.45  333717.46 1457860.05  -11.48a 
NI  Net  Income  64313.968 448915.69  15737.76 260734.79  -9.09a 
Note: Panel A shows the summary statistics by diversification, were MNC are multinational corporations with a FS/TS ratio greater than or equal to 10%, while domestic, 
represent firms with a FS/TS ratio less than 10%. We included a T-test to check the significance of the difference in mean variable between groups of firms. Panel B shows the 
summary statistics by specialization, were ICT are firms belonging to the information and communication technology sector as categorized by OECD (2000), based on their SIC 





Table 2: continued. 
Panel B: Specialization 
 ICT NON-ICT    
Variable Description  Mean  Std  Dev Mean  Std  Dev  Pooled  t-Test 
COC  Cost of Capital  17.80  9.45  13.94  8.14  -28.79a 
TD/TA  Total Debt to Total Assets  14.39 20.55  20.01 20.73  17.99a 
STD/TA  Short-term Debt to Total Assets  4.09  9.74  4.88  9.54  5.26a 
LTD/TA  Long-term Debt to Total Assets  10.30  18.71  15.13  19.01  16.47a 
BETA  Beta  2.28 1.30  1.54 1.15  -39.45a 
SAL5 Sales  Growth  5-years  26.92 44.89  19.18 39.57  -11.99a 
NI5  Net Income 5-years  9.18  25.34  7.48  20.87  -4.85a 
PTAX  Pretax  Margin  4.21 15.85  3.80 11.46  -2.03b 
ROA5  Return on Assets 5-years Average  3.84  9.20  4.67  8.26  6.24a 
ROA  Return on Assets    5.76  13.69  5.95  11.19  0.97x 
ROE5  Return on Equity 5-years Average  5.94  18.14  7.09  15.74  4.48a 
ROE  Return  on  Equity  8.40 23.63  9.66 22.16  3.58a 
FS/TS  Foreign Sales to Total Sales  23.87  27.74  11.91  22.59  -31.27a 
P/B  Price to Book  3.71  3.04  2.99  2.68  -16.47a 
P/B5  Price to Book 5-years Average  3.77  2.85  2.79  2.49  -23.83a 
NPE/TA  Net Plant & Equipment to Total Assets  16.04  16.24  26.24  22.33  32.50a 
ATO  Asset Turnover Ratio  44.01  12.51  42.18  15.39  -8.23a 
TA  Total  Assets  904420.84 5119904.34  453491.94 2208404.07  -8.07a 
CE Common  Equity  493643.73  2833277.12  210011.35  911113.97  -9.69a 
SAL  Sales  581346.89 2715154.49  525618.01 3424575.05  -1.13x 
NI Net  Income  57196.51  545408.89  20000.77  97211.49  -6.96a 
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Table 3: Pearson correlation coefficients. 
  YEAR  TD/TA COC  BETA ATO  LSAL  ROE5  FS/TS  NPE/TA  ICT 
Y E A R   1             
 
TD/TA  -0.0134  1           
  0.0741            
 
COC  -0.0654  -0.1814  1          
  0.0001  0.0001           
 
BETA  0.0218  -0.0919  0.7825  1         
  0.0037  0.0001  0.0001          
 
ATO  -0.0328  0.0546  -0.1461  -0.1489  1        
  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001         
 
LSAL  0.0676  0.1562  -0.1565  -0.1162  0.6113  1       
  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001        
 
ROE5  -0.0798 -0.0102 -0.1391 -0.1586  0.2250  0.2504  1         
  0.0001 0.1773 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001          
 
FS/TS  0.0789  -0.0664 0.1187 0.1592 0.0859 0.1727 0.0398  1      
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001        
 
NPE/TA  -0.0688 0.3319  -0.2035  -0.2057 0.1406 0.1449 0.0729  -0.1376  1    
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001      
 
ICT 0.0283  -0.1342 0.2117 0.2846 0.0618 0.0331  -0.0337 0.2291  -0.2376  1   
  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001   
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Table 4: Three Stage Least Squares estimation of the relationship between International Diversification, Leverage Ratios and Cost of Capital, 
by type of debt. 
Panel A: Leverage 
  Total Debt (Model 1)  Short-term Debt (Model 2)  Long-term Debt (Model 3) 
Variable  Description  Estimate   t-value  Estimate  t-value       Estimate  t -value 
INTERCEPT Intercept  -1.0665x -0.4300  15.2409a  12.7600  -13.3776a  -5.7700 
 … - COC  Cost of Capital  …x 0.0418a  -3.690 0.0374c  -1.7000 0 -    
 0.   LSAL  Log of sales  0.6907a  6.4600  0.5489a  10.7800  0.0837x 8500
ROE5  Return on Equity 5-years average  -0.0931a  -10.0000 -0.0269a  -6.1000 -0.0714a  -8.3300   
SAL5 Sales  Growth  5-years  -0.0146a  -4.0200  -0.0027x -1.5500  -0.0103a -3.0800 
FS/TS  Foreign Sales to Total Sales  -0.0201a -3.1100  0.0248a  8.0900  -0.0359a  -6.0400 
NPE/TA  Net Plant & Equipment to Total Assets  0.2691a  31.1500  0.0415a  10.1500  0.2408a  30.2600 
SIC2 Mining  -10.0821a  -4.1800  -1.4940x -1.3200  -8.1328a -3.6900 
SIC3 Construction  2.3434x 0.8100  0.9433x 0.6900  1.2730x 0.4800 
SIC4 Manufacturing  -7.2747a  -3.3300  -0.5230x -0.5100  -6.7787a -3.4000 
 0       SIC5  Transportation Communication   5.5528b  2.4700  0.9825x .9300 4.9358b 2.4000
SIC6 Wholesale  Trade  -1.6065x -0.7000  2.6150b  2.4300  -3.8049c  -1.8200 
SIC7 Retail  Trade  -11.2580a  -5.0300  -0.3070x -0.2900  -10.6580a -5.2100 
SIC8 Services  -7.1234a  -3.2500  -0.2422x -0.2300  -6.7521x -3.3700 
                      
MSE  Weighted Mean Square Error  18.7151  …  … 
R2  Weighted R-Squared  0.1766  …  …             
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Table 4: Continued 
Panel B: Cost of Capital 
  Total Debt (Model 1)  Short-term Debt (Model 2)  Long-term Debt (Model 3) 
Variable  Description  Estimate   t-value  Estimate  t-value       Estimate  t -value 
INTERCEPT  Intercept  6.0865a  10.1500 5.3328a  8.4100 5.9895a  10.2000 
TD/TA  Total Debt to Total Assets  -0.0356a  -4.8200  …  …  …  … 
STD/TA  Short-term Debt to Total Assets  …  …  0.0241x .8500 … …  0      
LTD/TA   Long-Term Debt to Total Assets …  …  …  …  -0.0436a  -5.5200 
LSAL  Log of Sales  -0.0850a  -3.3700  -0.1316a -4.8400  -0.0558b -2.0600   
BETA  Beta  2.9942a  60.5700 3.0107a  60.0300 3.0292a  61.9000 
ATO  Asset Turnover Ratio  -0.0020c  -0.5900 -0.0025c  -0.5500 -0.0065c  -1.8600 
FS/TS  Foreign Sales to Total Sales  -0.0006c -0.3600  -0.0001c  -0.0100  -0.0012b  -0.7300 
SIC2 Mining  -0.4166x -0.7000  -0.2168x -0.3600  -0.3987x -0.6700 
SIC3 Construction  -0.1588x -0.2200  -0.1431x -0.2000  -0.1927x -0.2700 
SIC4 Manufacturing  -0.1011x -0.1800  0.3814x 0.7000  -0.1489x -0.2700 
SIC5 Transportation  Communication  -0.6225x -1.1100  -0.8465x -1.5100  -0.6019x -1.0900 
SIC6 Wholesale  Trade  -0.3839x -0.6700  -0.0887x -0.1600  -0.5338x -0.9400 
SIC7 Retail  Trade  0.0715x 0.1300  0.5544x 0.9900  -0.0051x -0.0100 
SIC8 Services  -0.4257x -0.7700  0.0728x 0.1300  -0.4853x -0.8900   
 
MSE  System Weighted Mean Square Error  4.6520  0.9989  1.0087 
R
2  System Weighted R-Squared  0.7157  0.5629  0.5802 




  25Table 5: Three Stage Least Squares estimation of the relationship between International 
Diversification, Leverage Ratios and Cost of Capital, by Specialization. 
 
 NON-ICT  (Model  4)  ICT (Model 5) 
Variable  Description  Estimate   t Value  Estimate  t Value 
Panel A : Leverage 
INTERCEPT Intercept  -4.3582x -1.5200  12.2370a  5.9100
COC  Cost of Capital  -0.0557c  -1.6700  …x …
LSAL  Log of sales  0.8522a  6.7300  0.4691b  2.0300
ROE5  Return on Equity 5-years average  -0.0876a  -6.6900  -0.0761a  -5.9200 
SAL5 Sales  Growth  5-years  -0.0193a  -3.8700  -0.0116b  -2.2200 
FS/TS  Foreign Sales to Total Sales  -0.0296a  -3.2200  0.0045x 0.5200 
NPE/TA  Net Plant & Equipment to Total Assets  0.2416a  23.1700  0.3491a  21.5600 
SIC2 Mining  -9.0680a  -3.6600  …  … 
SIC3 Construction  1.7682x 0.5900  …  … 
SIC4 Manufacturing  -6.7809a  -3.0200  -19.8169a  -23.3200
SIC5  Transportation Communication   -4.6425c  -1.9200  …  … 
SIC6 Wholesale  Trade  -3.1062x -1.3100  -7.3025a -3.7200 
SIC7 Retail  Trade  -11.5619a  -5.0200  …  …
SIC8 Services  -6.2823a  -2.7700  -19.1143a  -21.7400
 
MSE  Weighted Mean Square Error  …  17.3604 
R2 Weighted  R-Squared  …  0.2613 
 
Panel B : Cost of Capital 
INTERCEPT Intercept  6.3488a  10.9000  4.8962a  7.5800
TD/TA  Total Debt to Total Assets  -0.0407a  -4.7500  -0.0296b  -2.3800 
LSAL  Log of sales  -0.1346a  -4.4200  -0.0273x -0.6300 
BETA Beta  3.0406a  48.6300  2.9251a  36.2000 
ATO  Asset Turnover Ratio  0.0055x 1.3600  -0.0131b  -2.1300 
FS/TS  Foreign Sales to Total Sales  -0.0005c  -0.2400  -0.0019c  -0.7300 
SIC2 Mining  -0.4659x -0.8400  …  …
SIC3 Construction  -0.1435x -0.2100  …  … 
SIC4 Manufacturing  -0.3450x -0.6700  1.3308a  3.3500
SIC5  Transportation Communication   -0.1457x -0.2700  …  … 
SIC6 Wholesale  Trade  -0.3963x -0.7400  0.4609x 0.7800 
SIC7 Retail  Trade  0.0362x 0.0700  …  … 
SIC8 Services  -0.2750x -0.5300  …  … 
 
MSE  System Weighted Mean Square Error  1.0221  5.1460 
R
2  System Weighted R-Squared  0.5674  0.6912 
Note: Significant at the less than 1% (a), 1–5% (b) and 5–10% (c) levels of significance. For non-ICT firms 
the reference industry used is industry 1 (agriculture, forestry and fishing), while for the ICT firms, the 
reference industry is a combination of excluded industries 2, 3, 5 and 7. 
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